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tion consists in the return of the property to the landlord in a
cheapened appearance at the end of the term, but this is not accurate.
On the contrary, the true irreparable damage to the plaintiff will take
place all during the lease term, and will consist in the cheapening
influence of the changed frontage upon the whole building, the repute
of the hotel, and the commercial respectability of the adjoining store
space. This condition, if allowed to exist for eight years, would continue to have its effect for an unpredictable time after the expiration
of the term.
Granting this as true, it is submitted that if a mandatory injunction is to issue at all, it should be directed at the continuation of a
condition which now causes irreparable damage and present injury
to the landlord, and that the only way to protect this present interest
is the grant immediate restoration. From these considerations the
proposition favored by the dissent seems not only to be more authoritative, but also more logical and reasonable than the majority, for:
"It is no justification of an act of waste that a party will at
some future time put the premises in the same condition as they
were when the lease was made. The landlord has a right to a
continuance of the state of things as they existed when the injury
was done.
HOWARD E. TRENT, JR.

REPEAL BY IMPLICATION
The county judge pro ter in Jefferson county presided at a
meeting of the fiscal court. It was objected that an appropriation
make by this court was not authorized by law and void because the
county judge pro ter could not preside at the meeting. Upon a
petition for a binding declaration of rights brought by the county
attorney the defendants contended that the legislature intended for
the pro tern judge to step into the shoes of the county judge and perform all of his functions including serving as a member of the fiscal
court. This contention was based on Section 1059 of the Kentucky
Statutes which provides:
"The county judge may by order entered on the order book
of the county court appoint and designate a county judge pro tern,
who shall serve at the pleasure of the county judge. . . Said
county judge pro tern shall when the county judge is absent from
office, or for any reason is made unable to perform the duties of
his office, perform any and all duties imposed by law upon the
regular county judge."'
In affirming the ruling of the lower court the Court of Appeals held
that the county judge pro tem may not preside at a meeting of the
fiscal court. Jefferson County Fiscal Court v. Grauman, 281 Ky. 608,
136 S. W. (2d) 1102 (1940).
" Supra notes 7 and 8.
33Hamburger & Dreyling et al. v. Settlegast et al., supra note 7,
at 641.
'Kentucky Statutes (Carroll, 1936) sec. 1059.

CASE COMMENTS
The court stated that were Section 1059 the only statute in reference to the appointment of a presiding officer for the fiscal court it
might be led to adopt the view contended for by the defendants.
However, in view of the fact that no pro tern judge is provided for in
the constitutional set-up of the fiscal court' and since repeals by implication are not favored, the court refused to adopt this contention in
face of Section 1833 of the Kentucky Statutes which reads:
"Each county in the Commonwealth of Kentucky shall have
a fiscal court, which shall consist of the judge of the county court
and the justices of the peace of said county . . . in which
court the judge of the county court shall preside, if present.
If said judge is not present and cannot preside then a majority
of the justices of the peace shall elect one of their number to
preside; said justice so elected to act as judge of said court during
absence or inability of a county judge to preside."
But the court further stated that a statute may be repealed by
implication if the provisions are so repugnant to each other that they
cannot be reconciled. The court reconciled the statutes in the instant
case by saying that the later statute gave to the pro tern judge only
those powers exercised by the county judge as such4 and not as a
member of the fiscal court.
Generally when the courts discuss the problem of repeal by
implication they begin by applying the maxim that "repeal by implication is not favored"' and then add "but when two statutes are so
repugnant as to be inreconcilable repeal by implication will operate."'
The apparent judicial dislike of repeal by implication is, however, generally overcome in cases: 1) where the later statute covers
the entire subject matter and is substantially a new enactment concerning the same subject;7 2) where parts of one statute are so repug'Kentucky Constitution, sec. 144.
'Kentucky Statutes (Carroll, 1936) sec. 1833.
' Apparently the court meant those duties exercised by the county
judge as as set out by Kentucky Statutes, sec. 1061 and following
defining the duties of the county judge. The function of the county
judge on the fiscal court arises from a statute concerning the court.
'United States v. Burroughs, 53 Sup. Ct. 574, 289 U. S. 159, 164
(1932); Sneeden v. City of Marion, 64 F(2d) 721, 728 (1933); Cissen
v. U. S., 37 F. (2d) 330, 331 (1930); Mays v. Phillip County, 170 Ark.
880, 279 S. W. 266, 268 (1925); Costa v. Reed, 113 Conn. 377, 155 Atl.
417, 419 (1931); Nash v. State, 205 Ind. 22, 184 N. E. 169 (1933);
State v. Bd. of Commissioners, 203 Ind. 23, 178 N. E. 563, 567 (1931);
Lewis v. Mosely, 215 Ky. 573, 286 S. W. 793 (1926); Town of Nichols
v. Tioga County, 224 N. Y. S. 267, 270 (1927).
'United States v. Tuginovich, 41 Sup. Ct. 551, 256 U. S. 450, 463
(1921); United States v. Tiger, 19 F(2d) 35, 38 (1927); Curlin v.
Watson, 187 Ark. 685, 61 S. W. (2d) 701, 702 (1933); State v. Std. Oil
of La., 179 Ark. 280, 16 S. W. (2d) 581, 584 (1929) p Ex Parte Bryson,
13 Cal. App. 546, 21 P. (2d) 695, 696 (1933); Bullen v. Anderson, 81
Utah 151, 17 P. (2d) 213, 215 (1923).
1
H. Rouw Co. v. Cirvella, 105 F. (2d) 434 (1939); Johnson City
v. Town of Hackman, 177 Ark. 1009, 85 S. W. (2d) 469 (1928);
Hessick v. Moynihan, 83 Colo. 43, 262 Pac. 907 (1928); Quick v.
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nant to the other that they cannot be reconciled;' 3) where a specific
or local act is inconsistent with a general law. Section 1059 in no
way attempts to cover the entire subject matter nor is it a special act;
therefore, our problem is to determine whether a repugnancy exists
between the two statutes and if so whether it is so great as to work
a repeal by implication.
The later of two conflicting acts on the same subject is deemed
legislative will," and when the subsequent act is in conflict with a
prior act, it, by implication repeals so much of the prior act as is in
conflict with the later act;" and that is true although it contains no
recital of such intent.'
The later act must be given full effect where
the conflict is irreconcilable." But there seems to be much diligence
of opinion as to just when such irreconcilable conflict occurs. California, for instance, holds that the inconsistency must be clear, actual
and irreconcilable." Mississippi says it must be "so repugnant as to
demonstrate legislative purpose".
The result of such a strict interpretation is that repeal by implication is hardly ever recognized. On
the other hand some jurisdictions applying the same maxims do find
in anologous cases that there is such repugnancy as to repeal the
prior statute."° It has been suggested that the difference in the various states might be accounted for by the fact that courts of a particular state acquire the "feel" of the legislature of that state and its
Smith, 86 Ind. App. 676, 159 N. E. 556 (1928); Godfrey v. Building
Com. of Boston, 263 Mass. 589, 161 N. E. 819 (1928); Lach v. Kenyon,
261 N. Y. S. 676, 146 Misc. 571 (1933); Peterson v. King County,
-Wash. -, 90 P. (2d) 729 (1939).
'State v. Std. Oil of Louisiana, 179 Ark. 280, 16 S. W. (2d) 581
(1929).
'People v. Mo. Pac. R. R. Co., 342 Ill. 226, 173 N. E. 816 (1931);
In re Ross, 21 N. Y. S. (2d) 848 (1940); Crable v. City of Cleveland,
115 Ohio St. 484, 154 N. E. 738 (1926).
" Board of Health v. Frohmiller, 42 Ariz. 231, 23 P. (2d) 941
(1933); People ex rel Pierce v. Howe, 217 N. Y. S. 739, 128 Misc. 31
(1926).
City of Bisbee v. Chochise County, 44 Ariz. 233, 36 P. (2d) 559
(1934); Gaddis v. Bd. of Commissioners of Gibson County, 93 Ind.
App. 658, 179 N. E. 279 (1932); McAdam v. Fed. Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 288 Mass. 537, 193 N. E. 362 (1935); State v. Taylor, 323 Mo. 15,
18 S.W. (2d) 474 (1929).
I See McDonald v. Wasson, 188 Ark. 782, 67 S. W. (2d) 722, 724
(1934). The court however found no repugnancy in the case-the
act dealt with different subjects.
'Trimble v. Kantas, 190 Ark. 1092, 82 S. W. (2d) 847 (1935);
State v. Second Judicial District, 52 Nev. 379, 287 Pac. 957 (1930).
" Chilson v. Jecome, 102 Cal. App. 635, 283 Pac. 862, 864 (1930).
The court held two statutes not in conflict.
"Coke v. Wilkinson, 142 Miss. 1, 106 So. 886 (1926); see also
New Smyrna v. Matthewson, 113 Fla. 861, 152 So. 706 (1934).
" Cullin v. Watson, 187 Ark. 685, 61 S. W. (2d) 701 (1933);
Ouachita City v. Stone, 173 Ark. 1004, 293 S. W. 1021 (1927); State v.
White, 170 Ark. 880, 281 S. W. 678 (1926); Masey v. State, 168 Ark.
175, 269 S. W. 567 (1925); Bullen v. Anderson, 81 Utah 151, 17 P
(2d) 213 (1933).

CASE COMMENTS
method of procedure. T But in general the aversion of the courts to
repeal by implication is so strong that even though there may be at
first glance a conflict the courts will attempt to harmonize the acts
1'
and construe them so as to be read together so that both may stand.
The law in Kentucky seems to be in accord with the following
principles: Repeal by implication is not favored," and if possible the
court will so construe the acts so that both shall be effective, providing it can be done without contradiction or absurdity; if any part of
the existing law can be harmonized or reconciled such part will not
'
A new law covering the whole subject repeals
be deemed repealed.
a prior law on the subject. ' Where two statutes confict a latter statute dealing with the specific subject matter is given effect rather than
'
If the
an earlier statute dealing with the subject in general terms.
repugnancy is so clear as to admit of no other reasonable construction
the prior act or part thereof will be deemed repealed.
While the Kentucky Court renders "lip service" to the maxim
that "repeal by implication will operate if the repugnancy is so clear
as to be irreconcilable", it apparently belongs to the group that strictly
interpret the word "irreconcilable", and so as a practical matter has
seldom declared the prior statute repealed. Further evidence of the
strict application of the maxim, "repeal by implication is not favored",
is found when the court takes the view that the legislature is presumed to know of the prior statute,"4 and if it intends a repeal thereof
it will so express itself. -' In the instant case the court seizes upon
"Note (1937) 37 Col. L. Rev. 292, first footnote.
"People v. Shader, 326 IM. 145, 157 N. E. 225 (1927); Bennett v.
Brewer Hardware Co., 160 La. 407, 170 So. 286 (1926); Perkins v.
N. H. Power Co., - N. H. -, 13 Atl. (2d) 475 (1940); Atlantic Life
Ins. Co. v. Wade, 195 N. C. 424, 142 S. E. 474 (1928).
'
Logsdon v. Howard, 280 Ky. 342, 133 S. W. (2d) 60 (1940);
V. T. C. Line v. Hurham, 272 Ky. 638, 114 S. W. (2d) 1089 (1938);
Williamson v. City of Raceland, 245 Ky. 212, 53 S. W. (2d) 370
(1932); Panke v. City of Louisville, 229 Ky. 186, 16 S. W. (2d) 1024
(1929); Schultz v. Ohio County, 226 Ky. 633, 11 S. W. (2d) 702
(1928); Naylor v. Bd. of Education, Fulton County, 216 Ky. 766, 288
S. W. 690 (1926); Lewis v. Mosley, 215 Ky. 573, 286 S. W. 793 (1926);
Commonwealth v. Barnett, 169 Ky. 731, 245 S. W. 874 (1922); Horton
v. Horton, 185 Ky. 131, 214 S. W. 88 (1919); Lee v. Forman, 60 Ky.
(3 Metc.) 101 (1860).
'
Tipton v. Brown, 277 Ky. 625, 126 S. W. (2d) 1067 (1937).
7'
Washburn v. Paducah Papers, 275 Ky. 527, 1212 S. W. (2d)
911 (1938); Ferguson v. Chandler, 266 Ky. 694, 99 S. W. (2d) 732
(1936); Bell v. Talbot, 252 Ky. 721, 68 S. W. (2d) 36 (1934).
'
Shannon v. Bucke, 276 Ky. 773, 125 S. W. (2d) 238 (1939).
Driedel v. Louisville, 268 Ky. 659, 105 S. W. (2d) 807 (1937);
Pineville v. Meeks, 254 Ky. 167, 71 S. W. (2d) 33 (1934); Russell v.
Bd. of Education of Logan County, 247 Ky. 703, 57 S. W. (2d) 68
(1933).
"Young v. Grauman, 278 Ky. 197, 128 S. W. (2d) 549 (1939);
Ferguson v. Chandler, 266 Ky. 694, 99 S. W. (2d) 732 (1936).
" Tipton v. Brown, 277 Ky. 625, 126 S. W. (2d) 1067 (1937);
Oldham County v. Arvin, 251 Ky. 317, 64 S. W. (2d) 907 (1933).
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the fact that the acts involved relate to distinct subject matters as
lending support to the conclusion that there is no repeal by implication.
It is believed that the instant case is consistent with prior decisions of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky and with the attitude to
which that court seems to be committed with reference to repeals by
implication.

JOE R. JoHNsoN, JR.

EQUITY: SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF A CONTRACT TO
RECONVEY LAND TRANSFERRED BY FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCE
Appellee deeded land to appellant, his son, to prevent the execution of a judgment lien held against his land. Appellant agreed to
reconvey and upon his failure to do so appellee filed this bill for
specific performance. Appellant contends there is no aid in equity
for one who transfers land in fraud of creditors. Appellee asserts
that his judgment creditor chose not to enforce his claim against the
land and therefore was not in fact defrauded. He claims further that
appellant failed to affirmatively plead the fraudulent conveyance.
The order of the Circuit Court granting specific performance was
overruled. Asher v Asher, 278 Ky. 802, 129 S. W. (2d) 552 (1939).
It is clear in Kentucky and elsewhere that one who transfers
land in fraud of creditors subjects himself to certain limitations on
future action, one of which is his inability to have specific performance of a contract to reconvey the land.' This inability results from
a failure to conform to equitable standards of conduct. These
standards as most often expressed by courts of equity in denying
relief are two: (1) the parties are in pari delicto.2 or (2) one must
come into equity with "clean hands". The court in the principal
case reaffirms this principle that equitable relief is predicated on a
"Section 1059 relates to the county judge and section 1833 deals
with1 the fiscal court.
Carson v. Beliles, 121 Ky. 294, 89 S. W. 208(1905); Coleman v.
Coleman, 147 Ky. 383, 144 S. W. 1(1912); Shamo v. Benjamin's
Adm'r., 155 Ky. 373, 159 S. W. 798(1913); Ballance v. Ballance, 213
Ky. 73, 280 S. W. 473(1926); Dunne v. Cunningham, 234 Mass. 332,
125 N. E. 560(1920); Palmer v. Palmer, 100 Neb. 741, 161 N. W. 277
(1917).
2
Jones v. Jefferson, 334 Mo. 606, 66 S. W. (2d) 555(1933) (The
materiality of the maxim "in pari delicto" is fully discussed in this
case that is strikingly like the instant case. The grantor conveyed
property to his daughter in anticipation of a suit for breach of
promise and was precluded by the doctrine of "unclean hands" from
having equitable relief from the daughter's repudiation of the agreement to reconvey). Accord: McRae v. McRae, 37 Ariz. 307, 294 Pac.
280(1930); New York, New Hampshire, etc., Railroad v. Pierce, 281
Mass. 479, 183 N. E. 836(1933).
vGrant
v. Grant, 296 S. W. 647(Tex. App. 1926); Brugman v.
Charleson, 44 N. D. 114, 171 N. W. 882(1919); Bouton v. Beers, 78
Conn. 714, 63 Atl. 193(1905).

